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Abstract 
This paper discloses an innovative step by step method based on TRIZ tools used according to the general approach suggested by 
FMEA. The aim of the proposed method consists in building an improved risk management model for design and to enhance the 
capability of anticipating problems and technical solutions to reduce failure occurrence. The method adopts tools used to model 
the system, such as functionality, Su-Fields models, resource evaluation and tools dedicated to problem solving such as standard 
solutions. The resulting method allows a better definition of the system decomposition and functioning and provides a sharp 
definition of the events and failures potentially occurring into the system, which is not provided by standard FMEA. Moreover, 
the high importance given to resources since the beginning of the method is extremely effective for understanding system 
evolution and to generate resource-based solution to problems dealing with product risk. The overall method has been developed 
so that technicians are not supposed to have a high level expertise in TRIZ tools. In order to evaluate the method it was tested 
with students with basic level TRIZ education and some application with industrial case studies were performed. 
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1. Introduction 
As product development cycles shrink and as products themselves grow more and more complex, managing risk 
in the product development process becomes increasingly critical. Preventing product failures in the early stage of 
product design, by adopting a proactive approach, is much more effective rather than reacting to a non-conformance. 
Actually, once reached the end of pipe most of technical solutions are already taken and any change highly affects 
costs. Some tools have been developed to foresee, assess and prevent product failure or malfunctioning mainly 
concerning design phase and production process. By the way companies are still quite reluctant to adopt risk 
management tools, especially for the design process whether it is not imposed by standards or customers’ 
requirements. Moreover it is a wrong common understanding that reliability is only based on mathematics and 
statistics and it should be relegated to logistics or maintenance departments [1]. The main reason for companies to 
avoid risk management activities relies on the high time needed and uncertainty of the quality of results achieved 
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with traditional tools. Actually, since products requirements constantly increase and acceptable failures rate drops 
dramatically, available tools to face risk management are not getting better quickly enough. The paper shows some 
results achieved within a research activity on this topic. In particular the goal is to make risk management tools more 
appealing for companies by trying to provide better results involving fewer resources. 
The paper in §2 shows a short state of the art concerning reliability engineering and risk management focusing on 
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) and TRIZ. The third paragraph describes the new method proposed to 
prevent design-caused failures. In §4 a case study shows a practical application of the method performed by students 
at the end of a TRIZ course at University of Bergamoo. Finally, some conclusions about this work and future 
activities on this topic are drawn. 
2. Background 
2.1. Reliability Engineering 
A deterministic reliability analysis process is built on the prevention of failures and the understanding of how and 
why failures occur. To effectively minimize the occurrence of failures, designers should have an excellent 
knowledge of the failure mechanisms which can be caused by incorrect design, manufacturing, or can be introduced 
by outside of the system (i.e. by users or environment). In any case dealing properly with failures involves a clear 
understanding of the physics of failures. When failure mechanisms are know and appropriately considered in each 
step of product lifecycle they can be minimized (preventive approach) or the system can be protected against them 
(compensative approach) through careful engineering measures [2]. 
Risk Management is a crucial part of reliability design and an effective application to every day company life 
bring several benefits [3]: 
y Formal Methodology: Risk Management is a structured tool for day-to- day decision-making.  
y Formal Procedures: When unanticipated problems occur (such as external events that were not foreseeable), 
Risk Management can help keeping on top of problem issues and efficiently contribute to their solution. 
y Added Value: A single averted risk on a product or operation can pay for many, if not all, Risk 
Management activities.  Recent examples exist where customers have used the contractor’s proposed Risk 
Management process and evaluation of candidate risks as a key evaluation parameter in competitive 
procurements. Thus, if performed effectively, Risk Management may not only help a project avert potential 
performance, cost, and schedule impacts, but it may also help win a contract.  
y Forward-Looking: Risk Management provides leverage on the front-end of a project and helps to avoid 
costly performance, cost, and schedule problems downstream.    
On the other hand several issues are still wide open to further innovation and solutions to critical points are 
requested. Lack of knowledge to understand all potential failure modes can be somehow compensated by experience 
for existing products but it is crucial each time a new technical solution is adopted. This may slow down the 
innovation process and contribute in failing to attend the rapid changes requested by competition. Once drawn the 
way failures may happen, next critical point concerns how to find the way to assess risks features. For instance, it’s 
generally recognized that using past performance or historical data to identify probability of occurrence of risks is 
not really working all that well. Moreover, existing state of the art tools do not yet overcome the need for a number 
of skilled people thinking about risks for a considerable and, sometimes unpredictable, amount of time. 
2.2. Risk management tools for product design 
Reliability engineering first appeared for aerospace applications and models to understand and handle risk and 
prevent failures were developed. Several improvements have been carried out so far and tools are still refining. By 
the way the underlying logic is so brilliant that it still is appreciated after almost half a century from the first 
application. The complimentary top-down Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) approach and bottom-up Failure Mode and 
Effect Analysis (FMEA) are still used nowadays, as well as Hazard and Operability analysis (HAZOP) and What-if 
checklist. 
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FTA [4] is the most commonly used technique for causal analysis in risk and reliability studies. It is a top-down 
approach to failure analysis, starting with a potential undesirable event (accident) called a top event, and then 
determining all the ways it can happen. The analysis proceeds by determining how the top event can be caused by 
individual or combined lower level failures or events and the causes of the top event are connected through Boolean 
gates. FTA leads to improved understanding of system characteristics. Design flaws but also insufficient operational 
and maintenance procedures may be revealed and corrected during the fault tree construction. FTA model is 
frequently built together with a FMEA model because they give different perspective on the same system. 
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis [5,6], is an organized approach to identify failure modes that could either 
directly result in, or contribute significantly to, the identified accident scenario by a multi-discipline team familiar 
with the product or process. The failure modes and failure causes are identified initially and are used as the starting 
point for the FMEA. A design FMEA is an analytical technique utilized primarily by a Design Responsible Engineer 
and his / her team as a means to assure that, to the extent possible, potential failure modes and their associated 
causes/mechanisms have been considered and addressed. 
An FMEA can be described as a systemized group of activities intended to:  
y Recognize and evaluate the potential failure of a product or a process and its effects,  
y Identify actions which could eliminate or reduce the chance of the potential failure occurring, and  
y Document the process. It is complementary to the design process of defining positively what a design must 
do to satisfy the customer. 
FMEA outcome is a spreadsheet listing all potentially failing elements, failure modes, effects and severity of 
failure modes, their causes and occurrence. Together with failures detection information these data are used to 
calculate a risk index called Risk Priority Number (RPN) which can be used to rank failures and adopt preventive 
actions. After design improvements the failure analysis should be performed again to ensure RPN values are below 
the chosen threshold. 
HAZard and OPerability analysis (HAZOP) [7], is a structured technique whose goal is to determine and evaluate 
failures from the point of view of safety of men and machine in contact with the system. It requires a multi-
discipline team performing a systematic study of a process using guide words to discover how deviations from the 
design intent can occur in equipment, actions, or materials, and whether the consequences of these deviations can 
result in a hazard. 
The results of the HAZOP analysis are the team's recommendations, which include identification of hazards and 
the recommendations for changes in design, procedures, etc. to improve the safety of the system. Deviations during 
normal, startup, shutdown, and maintenance operations are discussed by the team and are included in the HAZOP. 
2.3. FMEA integrations  
Along five decades of applications and refinements a number of synergies, more or less effective, have been 
proposed to integrate FMEA technique with other methodologies used in product development, production, and 
maintenance. Integration has the goal to create a synergy between two ways of performing product/process design to 
gather: 
y A more robust and quicker approach. 
y A better flow of product/process knowledge. 
y An easier introduction of new method and tools within the company. 
FMEA most frequent and effective contamination has been with Quality engineering because of the strict 
interaction with reliability issues of product and production processes. 
In [8] the relationship between major quality tools such as quality function development (QFD), FMEA, design 
of experiments (DOE) and statistical process control (SPC) is analyzed through an extensive review of the literature 
and the concurrent quality engineering philosophy, and a basic structure for the integration of quality tools is 
presented. 
QFD and FMEA are both effective tools utilized in the course of product development, however there are 
potential limitations if they are used separately. As they possess the characteristic of sharing the bottom database in 
an integrated quality management system, their integration may solve this issue. Based on an elaborate analysis of 
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advantages and disadvantages of QFD and FMEA, [9] proposes an integration model which four kinds of FMEA are 
incorporated into the four phase model of QFD. 
There exist also several cross fertilization examples of FMEA and others technique outside reliability and quality 
context. 
In [10] a new approach is proposed to enhance FMEA capabilities through its integration with Kano model. In 
almost all of the existing resources of failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA), “severity” is being determined from 
the designers’ point of view, not from the customers’ side. This evolves the current approaches for determination of 
severity and “risk priority number” (RPN) through classifying severities according to customers’ perceptions.  
Some efforts have been done also to merge more than two methods as shown in [11] where FMEA, QFD and 
TRIZ are the ingredients of a product development process. 
2.4. TRIZ and FMEA 
TRIZ is the most comprehensive systematic innovation and creativity methodology ever developed. Its main goal 
is to solve unconventional problems and to forecast technologies and future products, but it also provides a method 
to face reliability issues. By means of the Subversion Analysis concept TRIZ can help in those situations where an 
unexpected problem has occurred, and where we don’t know the source or cause of the problem. 
Subversion Analysis [12] also implemented as Anticipatory Failure Determination AFD [13] has several parallels 
with established methods like FMEA, HAZOP, or fault-tree analysis. The main difference is that it forces users to 
take a much more proactive approach to finding causes of problems. As a consequence, systems designed with this 
approach are less vulnerable to unpredicted failures. The logic of Subversion Analysis relies on finding all the ways 
to destroy the system we are designing. After this task we can much more easily design the system so that those 
modes of failure are eliminated or, at least, taken into account when implementing corrective actions. 
Subversion Analysis is about inventing failures. In this sense it has simply capsized the inventive problem 
solving: if we can invent a failure then we can use other TRIZ tools to eliminate it. Subversion Analysis is typically 
carried out as a systematic process.  
The key steps in the process involve the two inversions of the problem; firstly to allow us to ‘invent the failure’ 
(how would I design a system that failed in the way my system actually has), and then to re-transform the invented 
failure into a means of preventing the failure in the future.  
Main steps of a generic Subversion Analysis process are: 
1) Problem definition; 
2) Formulation of inverted problem; 
3) Define function; 
4) Identify failure modes; 
5) Describe effect; 
6) Determine cause; 
7) Identify failure hypothesis;  
8) Search for solution. 
In the followings Subversion analysis basic logic will be used and inversion of the problem will be performed, by 
the way the paradigm will not follow classical TRIZ way of performing failure determination. 
3.  New paradigm for risk management 
This paragraph shows the new paradigm developed to manage the risk of product failure or malfunctioning. The 
underlying philosophy corresponds to the Design FMEA logic of defining failure modes evaluating criticalities and 
risks. By the way some new steps are introduced to bring benefits to the whole process. The procedure starts with a 
general understanding of system functionality. This is not trivial and avoids bad understanding and misleading 
formulation of the real design intent. The procedure maintains the bottom up logic of FMEA and system is analysed 
starting from its components and their negative effects. Basic modelling tools are introduced to improve system 
understanding and to gather a better list of potential malfunctioning without involving several experts. The 
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evaluation is performed in order to ease as much as possible the following step of problem solving with the goal of 
reduce or eliminate product weakness.  
In the followings each step is shortly described and then the whole procedure will be applied to a case study to 
show a real application. 
3.1. Step 1: Identify Primary Function 
The use of Energy Material Signal (EMS) [14] and Element Name Value (ENV) [15] models to the whole 
technical system helps defining its overall primary function that otherwise could be misunderstood. EMS model 
suggest assessing the variation in the flux of energy, material and signal/information in order to determine what the 
system really stands for. EMS provides a clear description of any kind of technical system without the need of going 
into details. ENV model describes the system by means of its capability to change the Value of one or more Features 
of the Element, turning it from Object to the desired Product (Figure 1). 
 
 
 
Figure 1: ENV model to define Primary Function. 
 
3.2. Step 2: Define Elements and Effects 
After defining the Primary Function the technical system is divided into elements being either components of the 
technical system, elements of the super system or fields, according to a standard multiscreen resource analysis. 
Initially, the element list is built taking into account every single element not to miss the chance of finding all failure 
modes. In the following steps some elements will not be considered any more in order to speed up the analysis. 
Once elements are defined for each of them a list of effect is created by experts of the product development process. 
Since our final goal is building a set of failure modes, negative effects must be considered as well (Figure 2). 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Elements an negative effects tree. 
 
3.3. Step 3: Model Effects with ENV model 
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Once elements (including fields) and related effects are completely defined it is required to assess product risk 
according to FMEA criteria. This means that all potential failure modes must be identified. ENV model is used 
again but now focusing on each single element describing the effects in terms of features and values of each feature. 
At first, to describe the design intent, nominal (design) values are considered, afterwards values are decrease and 
increased to extreme values and emerging conditions are analysed as potential failure modes (Table 1). 
 
 
 
Table 1: ENV model used to find failure modes, example of an electrical wire. 
 
3.4. Step 4: Assess risk via RPN 
In this step, according to FMEA tables [16] the severity of damage produced by each failure mode, the 
probability of its occurrence and the ease of detection must be considered and assessed on a 0-10 scale. Starting 
from the most critical elements (i.e. those associated with the most critical effects) the failure modes are evaluated 
and Risk Priority Number (RPN) is calculated.  
3.5. Step 5: Su-Field modelling  
In this step the substance-field model of each critical situation is built, according to subversion analysis logic, in 
order to create the ‘machine’ to make the product fail. Standard solutions, mostly of class 1, must be used to 
complete the harmful machine and resource analysis play a key role to bring an abstract solution back to reality 
level. 
3.6. Step 6: Application of Standard Solutions  
Finally, when all critical situations have been drawn and boosted up by means of subversion analysis, the 
functions created to destroy the technical system are considered as negative (see Figure 3). Thus a reliability issue 
has been switched into a problem solving task that can be run by means of classical TRIZ problem solving tools, e.g. 
standard solutions. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Su-Fields models showing (a) insufficient interaction according to subversion logic (b) same interaction considered negative to 
solve the problem . 
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4. Case study 
The procedure described so far has been tested on several case studies on household appliances. Students of the 
last year of course of both mechanical and managerial engineering with basic knowledge on TRIZ fundamentals 
were asked to perform a risk management analysis task using the new procedure. The results obtained were 
examined to fix some problems in the procedure and refine it. 
In the following the application on a domestic hairdryer (Figure 4) of the new FMEA-TRIZ procedure is 
described to provide an example of a real application. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Hairdryer and main components. 
 
4.1. Step 1 
According to the EMS formulation (Figure 5) the hairdryer has the goal to transform still cold air into a rapid and 
hot air flow. According to the ENV model and with a wider perspective the tool of the system is the hot air flow, the 
Element is the hair, features are humidity and shape, which can assume respectively values wet and dry, and 
unshaped and combed (Table 2). Thus the functions performed by the hairdryer are to dry hair and to shape it. 
 
 
 
Figure 5: EMS model of a hairdryer. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: ENV model to define function(s) of a hairdryer. 
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4.2. Step 2 
In this step elements of the system are defined and listed. Mental inertia would bring the analyst to consider only 
material resources or the bill of material of the system. Resource checklist and multiscreen approach can be used to 
be sure not to forget elements that may play a key role in a failure mode. For instance, the design operating 
temperature or the average operating time are information resources; the way electrical energy enters the system and 
is transformed by different components into mechanical and thermal is an energy resource. Table 3 shows a partial 
list of elements taken into consideration for the analysis. 
 
 
 
Table 3: Part of the Element list. 
 
After element list is complete and validated for each element all negative effects are listed. A fragment of the 
result obtained is reported in Table 4. 
 
 
 
Table 4: Part of Negative effect list for each element. 
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4.3. Step 3 
In this step failure modes are determined starting from negative effects of the elements listed before. Moving 
values of features from an extreme value to the opposite one is quite easy to define a set of potential malfunctioning 
even without being product experts. 
Students split into small groups were able to perform such a critical task providing almost the same results. A 
small part of the spreadsheet is shown in Table 5. 
4.4. Step 4  
According to normal FMEA procedure Severity, Occurrence and Detectability are evaluated and 0 to 10 marks 
are assigned to each failure mode by means of referring tables [16]. The Risk Priority Number and Criticality is then 
calculated, as shown in Table 5. 
 
 
 
Table 5: ENV model and RPN assessment. 
 
4.5. Step 5 
Engine results to be one of the most critical components since several failures with high RPN have been 
identified. Thus, we started the analysis from it and in the followings the analysis for the most critical event, engine 
mechanical failure (RPN=24), is presented. 
Next task consist in identifying the causes for the effect “mechanical failure” of the component engine and the 
field that enable such interaction, as shown in Table 6. 
What to do next is to search for resources that can cause the effect asking simple questions according to this 
template: 
Is there any <kind of resource> inside the system able to provide a <cause> such that the <element> will be 
affected by <effect>? 
For the first cause in table 6, “collision”, the question is: 
Is there any <system resources, e.g. blade fragment or ball of dust> inside the system able to provide a 
<collision> such that the <engine> will be affected by <a mechanical failure>? 
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Table 6: Fields enabling mechanical failure. 
 
Appling this template for any item of the resource list a complete set of scenarios of the mechanisms to destroy 
the system is provided. Once the most likely to work are selected the su-field models are easily created since object, 
field and tool are already defined. Figure 6(a) shows an example of su-field interaction of a machine creating a 
failure. 
In most cases the interaction between tools and abject is not sufficient and it could be amplified by means of 
standard solutions for a system whose function is not performed at the desired level (i.e. standards 1-1-2 to 1-1-5 
and 2-1-1 to 2-2-6). 
4.6. Step 6 
Last step consist in inverting the problem for the second time, which is bringing it back to the original meaning of 
preventing failures. Operatively this is done by turning positive interaction (either sufficient or not) of the 
subversion su-field model into negative interactions as shown in figure 6(b). 
By doing this we have finally switched a reliability issue into a problem solving activity for which traditional 
TRIZ tools can be applied. In particular having a model of the problem in terms of su-field in which a harmful 
interaction must be eliminated, once again standard solution will help us finding a solution (i.e. standards 1-2-1 to 1-
2-5) as shown in figure 6(c).  
 
 
 
Figure 6: Example of transition from (a) failing machine model to (b) problem model to (c) solution model. 
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5. Summary 
This paper after defining the working context of reliability engineering and risk management propose a new way 
of facing risk in design. Starting from FMEA concept and TRIZ subversion analysis a new procedure has been built 
in order to enhance existing tools by introducing ENV models and using resource and standard solutions. A case 
study has been presented in order to clarify the logic and the application of the tools. 
The presented case study refers to a product that is completely defined and available on the market. This 
condition is a bit easier if compared to the development of a brand new product. Traditional risk analysis is strongly 
based on components details and experience. The proposed way of performing risk assessment is shifted to a 
functional level in which some details can be neglected without the risk of missing the goal.  
Future works on this topic will bring this procedure into a real industrial product development process in order to 
look for weak points students’ testing may have neglected. Moreover the application to larger systems will probably 
require some more refinements to help designer dealing with a large amount of data. 
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